Monday, October 22, 2018

Trans-Atlantic Drift in Foreign Policies of The EU and the USA on Israel-Palestine

By Paulius Svetukaitis and Mathieu Panarotto

This blog post was written for the course "Current Issues in Global and EU Affairs", which took place from February 12-April 30, 2018.

A photo of the press taking photographs and various dignitaries posing and applauding in front of a stone wall bearing a large stone seal of the US government. Next to the wall is a temporary banner reading 'Embassy of the United States, Jerusalem, Israel.'
The dedication ceremony for the US Embassy in Jerusalem
Image credit: The White House via Wikimedia Commons
The decision by the US to transfer its embassy in Israel to Jerusalem has not been met with endorsement by the European Union. Although the external action was more unified in comparison to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, some Member States remain deviant in broader multilateral fora.

Although current US foreign policy towards Israel-Palestine infringed “Phase III”1 of the “Roadmap for Peace” initiated by the “Middle East Quartet”, it does not rule-out the idea of a two-state solution nor the idea of Jerusalem as capital of both states. However, Trump’s decision challenges both the US long-term commitment and credibility to find consensus-based solution, and the role of the international community in the peace process.

Historically, the Israel-Palestine problem has been an issue where EU and US standpoints would follow the same political line, but now it puts the EU institutions and its Member States under pressure. By taking an unprecedented stance, Trump throws the ball directly at the EU and it clearly has a divisive effect. HR/VP - Federica Mogherini reaffirmed the strong believe that the best solution for both parties (Israel and Palestine) would include Jerusalem as capital of both. In the meantime, she was frustrated by Hungary which vetoed a statement the EU intended to produce to express concerns about the US decision2. Where one could think that the EU had a relatively unified approach to the crisis of embassy relocation until the Iraq war in 2003, this stance is now less coordinated at broader fora where Czech Republic, Latvia, Croatia, Poland, Romania joined Hungary in abstaining to dismissing Trump’s action3.

In conclusion, the US and the EU have now taken different approaches in dealing with the Israel-Palestine issue. While the EU remains consistent in its policies and committed to a multilateral problem-solving agenda, the US has opted for a unilateral approach, which seems to have been met positively only by Israel and created a unanimous backlash by the international community that does not help the peace process.

Footnotes

1Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. p, 6. Online: www.globalpolicy.org. Available: https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/189-israel-palestine/38357-the-road-map.html.
2http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_eu_backed_into_a_corner_on_israel_palestine
3http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/un-jerusalem-vote-live-updates-latest-news-general-assembly-us-israel-capital-donald-trump-a8122641.html

Monday, October 8, 2018

Trump, Transatlantic Relations and the New EU-US Security Order

By Megan Eve O'Mahony and Ariadni Stavroula Zormpa

Screencap of a Donald Trump tweet from March 18, 2017 reading, '...vast sums of money to NATO & the United States must be paid more for the powerful, and very expensive, defense it provides to Germany!'
This blog post was written for the course "Current Issues in Global and EU Affairs", which took place from February 12-April 30, 2018.

Almost two years after Trump’s election, European leaders still struggle to make sense of his administration’s foreign policy. Trump’s “Doctrine of unpredictability” extends to the sensitive matter of  security and defense agendas. During his first State of the Union address, President Trump said his administration is restoring America’s strength and standing abroad. In a time where Trumps brinkmanship has challenged the global and international order, Europe seems to acknowledge, as Angela Merkel has posited, that the “times in which we could completely depend on each other, are to an extent over.”

To begin with, under the “America first” foreign policy, Trump’s administration published in January 2018 a new National Defense Strategy. Τhe Pentagon’s central message is that “Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security”. China and Russia have been clearly elevated to a top threat, with President Trump vowing to use “all available tools” to prevent China’s “statist policies” to fight trading policies detrimental to the US economy. Terrorism, relegated to a lesser-threat category. Furthermore, another critical point of the document is that the US military is “emerging from a period of strategic atrophy.” The word “atrophy” could be interpreted in different ways. However, we can imagine that in Trump’s vocabulary and under the ‘America first’ narrative, “atrophy” means economic decay concerning military power.

Mr. Trump’s brinkmanship is obvious when it comes to defense strategy. His administration is pursuing a policy to the verge of safety, sometimes forgetting that one of the two sides will eventually collapse. In his 80-minute speech, this is evident; “Around the world, we face rogue regimes, terrorist groups, and rivals like China and Russia that challenge our interests, our economy, and our values.”

It is worth noting, however, that in the context of history, Trump’s perception of transatlantic defence as a zero-sum game may not be an aberration in policy, but an acceleration of America’s retreat from bearing the financial brunt of the “defense burden” for the last 75 years.

America, a country tired by the financial ravages of war has long been critical of European “free riders” not paying their fair share. However, so has Obama, contending in 2014 that Great Britain would no longer be able to claim a “special relationship” if it did not, as part of NATO, commit to spending at least 2% on defence.

In the current administration which theoretically seems to be “strategically predictable but operationally unpredictable”, Merkel’s statement heeds warning. It is consequently imperative that initiatives, such as the European Union’s Global Strategy, PESCO etc., focus on furthering closer security and defence co-operation, as the rapidly changing security and defense  environment provides only one certainty, that nothing is certain.