The European Union's "One Voice" in Security Affairs

By Katherine Brown

This blog post was written for the course "Current Issues in Global and EU Affairs", which took place from February 12-April 30, 2018.

US President Donald Trump recently welcomed French President Emmanuel Macron to the White House, and it was quite the spectacle. If there was any pomp in Washington D.C., it was put on display for the French President. It is not surprising, the French and US military routinely partake in military exercises, spends billions on military equipment – and this is only in the current century (let us not forget who funded the rebellion against the British). The security relationship between France and the United States remains strong even in the face of Donald Trump, who most people assumed would doom any good and meaningful relationships the US has. In fact, President Trump seems to have gotten one memo from the swamp – France matters when it comes to security. While a good relationship between two strong military nations is all fine and dandy, where does that leave those who want to transcend national militaries? Where does this leave the European Union?

I will make this argument very clear – the European Union will never truly reach high level integration when it comes to security and military affairs precisely because of nations like France and relationships like the French-US alliance. It is similar with the United Kingdom (though their membership in the EU is expiring) – where the US goes, the French and UK are likely to follow militarily. These alliances scream nationalism – with all the pomp and glory to go with it. The nation is the most important identity with militaries. There is a singular leader, a flag to fight under, and comradery. While the European Union could grasp the concept of a common flag and comradery, they will be hard pressed to find one leader. Leaders like Angela Merkel and Macron are already in a constant battle to stay the most relevant and most vital leader in the EU. For a group looking to consolidate its efforts in security, that is a bad combination.

You will be hard pressed to find all regions in the European Union demanding security ‘one voice’ consolidation at the same time and that is because the European Union has so many different security fronts. The Baltic nations will freak out when Russia makes a move, but you’ll find the Italian government yawning over it. Likewise, the Syrian Refugee Crisis had the Italian government scrambling for any sort of assistance from the EU, meanwhile countries like Austria and Hungary were scoffing at the idea that they had to lift a finger to help. Because the EU doesn’t suffer large scale security crisis that equally effects each member state, enthusiasm for security integration comes and goes, and usually goes quietly into the night.

The United States is like a wrench in the EU’s security affairs. They have a heavy presence in Europe, and this is not necessarily a good thing. While the Baltic nations feel secure with the US there, this actually makes countries like Germany and France ‘lazy’. They are not growing their militaries in the face of security threats precisely because the United States picks up the slack. One cannot be enthused about security integration if someone else picks up where they leave off. If the US was not so involved in protecting Europe, we’d probably see countries appear more interested in furthering integration, or see member states like France and Germany build a new identity based on being protectors of Europe. For now, the wrench the US is throwing is large and wrapped in pretty bows, and talk of common security and defense takes another shameful exit from the EU’s agenda.

Transatlantic Conversations: A Review of the Leuven Roundtable

By Rafael A. Rodríguez Diaz

This blog post was written for the course "Current Issues in Global and EU Affairs", which took place from February 12-April 30, 2018.

The Leuven Roundtable. l-r: Prof. Michael Smith, Mr. Alexandros Papaioannou, Mr. Richard Tibbels, Prof. Simon Duke

As part of the graduate-level seminar of EURO 596, which explores current issues in global and European Union (EU) affairs, and in the framework of the Jean Monnet ERASMUS+ and Leuven-Illinois project, “Conversations on Transatlanticism and Europe”, 3 students and I participated in a study abroad trip to the Catholic University of Leuven in Belgium during the Spring Break of 2018. As part of our agenda, on March 19, we attended a roundtable entitled: “The Transatlantic Community between Contestation and Cooperation”. This round table was divided into two parts: a) “Contestation, Cooperation and Global Threats in the Transatlantic Security Community”; and b) “Transatlantic Competition, Cooperation and Contestation in the Area of Trade and Sustainability. Here, for the purposes of this post, I would like to focus on some aspects from the first part in which the following people participated:

• Mr. Richard Tibbels, head of Division ‘United States and Canada Division’ from the European External Action Service; 
• Mr. Alexandros Papaioannou, from the Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, NATO; 
• Prof. Michael Smith from the University of Warwick and Guest Professor at KU Leuven; and 
• Professor Simon Duke from the European Institute for Public Administration in Maastricht.

If there was a common agreement among the guest speakers was the fact that the United States (US) has been a strategic partner for the EU, but the transatlantic relation has become more challenging to address under the current American administration. As Mr. Papaioannou and Mr. Duke mentioned, even though the discussion on international policies in different areas has always existed, what changed was the tone which has now become more troubled. Mr. Tibbels and Mr. Smith also pointed out that the significant number of senior officials yet to be appointed by the US government, create gaps of communication that complicate the conflicting-perceived tone even more. However, Mr. Duke also mentioned that, for instance, even though the debate regarding the mutual defense spending started decades ago, the Trump administration has achieved to create a greater awareness of the differences that the US and the EU administration hold, especially in security and defense. It was clear during the round table that the pattern according to which the US kept complaining while the EU seemed just to be listening without any further action has finished, and the EU is now waking up. Mr. Papaioannou reinforced this common view by affirming that Trump’s form of speech is influencing the whole debate within the EU. Mr. Tibbles also supported it by saying that now the EU needs to continue working on a further European Integration to face this new transatlantic tone in a positive way.

What became the most interesting piece of information for me out of this round table was Mr. Smith’s final intervention. He was certainly right to mention that the US and the EU need to pay attention to how to strengthen the fundamentals of their relations. He stated that this transatlantic order is suffering pressures from inside and outside. The focus cannot be only on the intern- and trans-governmental relationships but also on the transnational relations displayed through businesses and social and cultural movements. These areas have also been attached to strains that they may not have faced before. Brexit, for example, is and will present a new era for the four economic freedoms: goods, services, labor and capital of the EU. It is a moment of international competition in which special attention needs to be given both by the US and the EU to China and Russia, and the current peace agreements happening between North and South Korea.

One of my short and mid-term objectives, after receiving a Master of Arts in European Union Studies, includes observing how these two global actors will work to make sure the gaps on security and defense and more recently in trading do not become bigger. As agreed after the round table, it is indeed necessary that a recalibration of the transatlantic relations takes place, where the future of the fundamentals of these transatlantic relations can be set to face current and future tones.

One Exemption After Another: The EU's Fight on Trump's Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum

By Alberto M. Burgos-Rivera

This blog post was written for the course "Current Issues in Global and EU Affairs", which took place February 12-April 30, 2018.

To many a political analyst, Trump’s tariff increase on both steel and aluminum imports, by 25 and 10 percent respectively, were to eventually come as part of President Donald Trump’s campaign promise. That promise came to take place in early March 2018. Riding on an economic nationalist platform, some of the arguments presented by President Trump were based on security concerns, arguing that domestic metal production was vital to the United States’ national security. On the other hand, President Trump argued that increased from states like China caused a worldwide decrease in steel prices, making American steel uncompetitive for the international market, hence, making the US dependent on foreign imports. Initially, the imposition of tariffs was to be applied to all countries.

With President Trump’s announcement of steel and aluminum tariffs came the immediate reaction of its allies in lobbying for an exemption for their imports. Initially, both Canada and Mexico successfully managed to become exempt from Trump’s tariffs. The issue became complicated when the EU found out its steel exports were also to be subject to tariffs. For instance, the EU questioned the US’s motive and stated that it would undermine transatlantic relationships. The EU did not pose a security threat to the United States, hence, there was no reason to impose tariffs on EU products. As a result, the EU almost immediately stated that it was ready to counteract by imposing tariffs on US products such as oranges, and Harley Davidson motorcycles. Despite the tariffs to be imposed in March, Trump granted an exemption on incoming steel and aluminum until May first.

At the beginning of May, however, the White House announced yet another, and possibly its last, extension on exemptions on steel and aluminum imports. It has been argued that the delays serve as a measure to force countries to negotiate individually with the US on trade. If the implementation of tariffs is considered to be a national security issue, then the EU has argued that it is not them whom the tariffs should be applied to but China since Chinese overproduction has caused a decrease in steel prices. On the other hand, the US has accused the EU’s policies of being highly protectionist and that such policies have greatly affected US farmers and carmakers.

It has been stated that the US decision to prolong the exemption only serves to prolong market uncertainty, which is already affecting market decisions. Despite EU steel and aluminum being temporarily exempt from tariffs, the Trump administration is mostly focused on imposing quotas that will restrain imports, prevent transshipment, and protect national security. While the EU has stated to be willing to negotiate trade agreements with, it has also stated that it I not willing to establish negotiations although not under threat.

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References

Lawder, David and Jeff Mason (2018, March 7) “Trump sets steel and aluminum tariffs but
exempts Canada, Mexico” Reuters.

Swanson, Ara (2018, March 1) “Trump to Impose Steel and Aluminum Tariffs”
The New York Times.

McAtee Cerbin, Carolyn (2018, March 23) “Trump exempts some allies from steel, aluminum
Tariffs” USA Today.

Cassella, Megan (2018, May 1) “Trump grants the EU extra month of relief from steel tariffs:
moves deadline to June 1” Politico.

Oliver, Christian (2018, May 1) “EU slams Trump for short delay on steel tariffs” Politico.