The Snowden Effect on Transatlantic Relations

When the NSA surveillance scandal became public, it eroded transatlantic trust, write Alexandra Brzozowski and Mitchell Wilkinson.

This blog post was written for the course "Current Issues in Global and EU Affairs", which took place from February 12-April 30, 2018.

Edward Snowden in 2013
Image credit: Wikimedia user McZusatz

Snowden’s disclosures revealed that the NSA together with partner intelligence agencies, in seemingly limitless capacity, monitored and stored communications of almost all states. Reports disclosed it ‘bugged offices, accessed internal computer networks, obtained documents and emails, and listened in on phone calls’. Striking is, that while inside the US it was clear that some legal institutional limits are in place−as few as they may seem− there are virtually no restrictions on US intelligence activities abroad. However, the more daunting truth for leaders worldwide was that the US spied on other governments and did not distinguish between friend and foe.

For transatlantic relations, the situation ignited a political drawback.

The broad extent of espionage, including interception of personal communications of friendly heads of state and government, as well as the handling of criticism caused consternation. Senior European officials, in response to revelations that various EU offices had also been targeted, have not been able to invoke clear and concise answers from US colleagues. President of the European Parliament, Martin Schulz, demanded for immediate clarification from Washington, but responsible officials refused to comment. Many European leaders, however, tried to justify the surveillance practices as they often happened in coordination with their national intelligence agencies. At first, German Chancellor Angela Merkel also defended them, describing the US as ‘truest ally throughout the decades’, but as it became clearer that even her private phone had been tapped, she concluded that ‘spying among friends is not acceptable.’

The targeted espionage had significantly damaged the trust needed for close and constructive political cooperation with the US. Those on the European side of the Atlantic, who have historically questioned US motivations, have had their suspicions confirmed, and it created a political environment where it was increasingly difficult for Transatlanticists to justify their positions to a European public that grew widely suspicious. On the other, European intelligence services have always cooperated very closely with the US, operating under the assumption that security interests were broadly aligned. In the aftermath, this state of cooperation could hardly be maintained or justified to the public. In Europe, there seems to be a broad consensus that US intelligence activities violated basic civil liberties.

The scandal proved to play an important role in shaping the narrative around data privacy between the allies on both sides of the Atlantic. Snowden's disclosures ignited political turmoil in the US and abroad and served as a catalyst for an international conversation over the balance between privacy rights and national security.

Frenemies? The new relationship status of transatlantic security cooperation

By Marie Brethous and Laura Skana

This blog post was written for the course "Current Issues in Global and EU Affairs", which took place from February 12-April 30, 2018.

Meet PESCO, the new kid on the block.

NATO and PESCO states.
Blue countries are only in PESCO, red are only in NATO,
purple countries are members of both PESCO and NATO
Image credit: Wikimedia Commons user JLogan

‘More Security for the EU and its citizens’ is what the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) will bring to the table. The initiative signed by 25 EU member states, aims to enhance their cooperation in the area of security and defence, by allowing them to jointly develop capabilities and therefore enhance EU’s role as an international security actor. The mandate for PESCO is defined in the Treaty of the EU, art 42(6), art 46 and Protocol 10. It is a specific CSDP mechanism that allows member states to voluntarily commit regarding defence and security. On 11 December 2017 the 17 collaborative PESCO projects were introduced, including for example. the establishment of a European Medical Command, an EU training Mission Competence Centre.  On 6 March 2018, the Council adopted a roadmap with strategic direction and a calendar for the review and assessment processes of the national implementation plans.

A brief history of NATO and how PESCO fits in the picture.

NATO, or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation established in 1949 seeks to ensure security and freedom for its 29 members through political and military means. To do so, NATO sets out capability targets its members need to meet and contribute to. Indeed, NATO plays a crucial role in guiding its members regarding what capabilities the Alliance needs, by using a set of tools in a multinational context. These tools are based on international, multilateral cooperation, e.g. the NATO Response Force (NRF) and the Strategic and intra-lift Capabilities. PESCO, as such, can be considered as another mechanism NATO uses to meet its capability targets, as the former is a centralised unit that could generate significant capacity EU Member States and NATO members cannot generate by themselves (e.g. Germany or France). Thus, following this logic, PESCO actually strengthens the ‘European pillar’ of NATO.

Sharing is caring.

The launch of PESCO was met with US scepticism, especially regarding its relation to NATO. But that just confirms that PESCO has real potential, right? Right. However, it is far from threatening NATO’s position in transatlantic relations.

The 25 States initiative is set to improve burden-sharing within the Alliance, in a way that would not be competing, but would be complementary to NATO. As per Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General, PESCO needs more coherence regarding development of capabilities, i.e. avoiding two sets of requirements for the same nations. Therefore, developments under PESCO must also be available for NATO. Further, it is positive for the US, as the 25 EU States will also be capable of mounting autonomous operations in their own periphery, without needing to recourse to American assets.